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devices and for aggregation of up to 10 attributes in big networks. 1. Introduction
Nowadays, information technologies are rapidly evolving and
the amount of electronic information shared in networks is in-
creasing. Moreover, large volumes of data are continuously being 
exchanged. In this sense, data analysis and data aggregation are 
valuable activities, but their implementation in distributed and 
untrusted networks is challenging (Rajagopalan and Varshney, 
2006).
In many scenarios the aggregation of information is not 
straightforward. Consider for example a football stadium with a 
capacity of 120,000 people. How to determine how many people 
are more likely to receive medical attention? This would allow a 
better calculation of the required emergency personnel. One 
straightforward approach would be to retrieve information (say 
heart rate) from attendees’ personal devices (such as smart bra-
celets/watches or even Implantable Medical Devices). However, 
privacy issues may arise since personal information is at stake. 
Data should be exclusively accessible to authorized users pre-
venting eavesdropping (He et al., 2007; Wenbo et al., 2008; Chenz-Manzano) 
.uc3m.es (S. Pastrana), 
 (L. Hernández-Encinas).and Lou, 2015). Moreover, data should remain unlinkable to 
owners (He et al., 2007; Wenbo et al., 2008; Applebaum et al., 
2010). It is needed to have a privacy-preserving mechanism that 
aggregates the information to provide with a general view of the 
situation.
Even more, an aggregate view cannot be enough. For example, 
a fast heart rate may be less dangerous in younger people than in 
elderly ones. It is then necessary to enable an aggregation that 
allows answering questions such as How many people have fast 
heart rate? And how many of them are older than 50? We coin the 
term correlatable aggregation to refer to this need, as it involves not 
only having the global value, but also identifying how the different 
variables relate each other. Previous attempts have focused on 
data aggregation (Xiaoying et al., 2014; Buttyán and Holczer, 2010; 
Kumar et al., 2015; Ren et al., 2013; Madden et al., 2002) among 
collected data. Data security (mainly integrity) and privacy has 
also been considered, e.g. He et al. (2007) and Applebaum et al.
(2010). However, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, no pro-
posal addresses the need of correlatable aggregation.
The Internet of Things (IoT) in a broad sense is a network of 
physical objects with the capacity to collect and exchange data. 
The involved objects are very diverse; cars, fridges and buildings 
are common examples but opportunities are immense, including 
food, clothes, and all the variety of living things (i.e., plants, ani-
mals and even ourselves). The objects are embedded with1
electronic, software and network connectivity. Wireless Sensor 
Networks (WSNs) is only a part of the IoT (Alcaraz et al., 2010) and 
the two principal differences with other IoT objects (e.g., smart-
phones or smart meters) are the computing capabilities and the 
ability to install applications of third-parties. On the other hand, at 
the beginning, WSNs were considered as isolated networks and 
the Internet connectivity has been recently added, which brings 
some challenges (Christin et al., 2009).
Having considered the distinction between WSNs and IoT, in 
IoT aggregation mechanisms are an issue due to resource limita-
tions (Gubbi et al., 2013) and scalability concerns (Hai et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, several attacks (such as fabrication or manipulation 
of data) may be carried out to frustrate this action (Xiaoying et al., 
2014). Considering these issues, in this paper we propose PAgIoT, 
a Privacy-preserving Aggregation protocol for IoT. In PAgIoT, data 
is decomposed into a set of attributes which are aggregated 
sepa-rately. A central node (sink) queries for the value of certain 
attri-butes, and remainder nodes respond depending on whether 
they possess or not these attributes. As many nodes may have the 
same attribute, intermediate nodes perform aggregation to 
save net-work resources. In this way, PAgIoT enables gathering 
data con-cerning several attributes of each entity in a single 
operation en-suring data authenticity and privacy. PAgIoT 
leverages on cluster-ing to deal with large-scale scenarios. Going 
back to the stadium setting, it allows zoning responses so that 
a better personnel placement could be achieved. Furthermore, it 
also leverages on the Paillier cryptosystem, which enables 
collecting information in a privacy-preserving way. PAgIoT also 
enables detecting malicious manipulation of aggregated 
information.
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 gives the 
background of the Paillier cryptosystem. Section 3 introduces the 
model considered in PAgIoT. Section 4 describes PAgIoT, 
whereas Section 5 shows its evaluation. Related works are 
described in Section 6. Finally, Section 7 outlines conclusions 
and future re-search directions.2. Background: Paillier cryptosystem
In order to deal with privacy-preserving aggregation, PAgIoT 
uses the Paillier cryptosystem (Paillier, 1999). Note that there are 
other homomorphic encryption schemes which could be similarly 
applied but Paillier's is chosen as a successful alternative. In par-
ticular, Benaloh scheme (Benaloh, 1986) is a feasible choice. 
However, it is appropriate for long blocks of input data, which is 
not the case herein, and it involves higher computation costs in 
comparison with Paillier cryptosystem (Singh and Dutta, 2014). 
Therefore, this section gives the reader a brief description of 
Paillier cryptosystem.
Paillier system is a public key cryptosystem based on the de-
cisional composite residuosity assumption. Let p and q be prime
numbers, = ·n p q, and the Euler's totient function
ϕ ( )n ¼ ( − )·( − )p q1 1 . Given ϕ( ( )) =n ngcd , 1, the hardness of this
problem is to decide whether an element in *
n2
is an nth power of
an element in *
n2
, that is, if there exists a number ∈ *y
n2
such
that z n= (mody n2) (Stern, 2003).
Paillier system is an additive homomorphic cryptosystem, that is,
the addition of two plain text messages, m1 and m2, can be ob-
tained as the decryption of the multiplication of the corresponding
encrypted messages, ( )? m1 and ( )? m2 . In other words, it is veriﬁed
that
( )( ) × ( ) = +? ? ?m m m m .1 2 1 2
This homomorphic property is paramount in PAgIoT, as it al-
lows intermediate nodes to aggregate data without having accessto the actual information.
The following subsections describe the encryption/decryption
procedures and the digital signature scheme deﬁned by Paillier
cryptosystem.
2.1. Encryption/decryption procedures
The encryption and decryption operations involve the follow-
ing steps:
 Key generation: Let k be a security parameter. Choose k-bit
prime numbers p and q, compute = ·n p q, and determine Car-
michael's function λ ( ) = ( − − )n p qlcm 1, 1 . Moreover, let
⊂ *α B n2 be the set of elements of order α·n , ⊂ *B n2 the disjoint
union of the sets αB for α λ= …1, , and generate ∈g B, at ran-

dom. This can be done efﬁciently by checking whether
gc  d L gλ( (mod n2) ,) n( ) = 1, where the function L (·) is deﬁned as 
L u( ) = u −1          (Paillier, 1999).
n
Then the public key is the pair ( ,n g), whereas the private key is
the pair ( ,p q), or equivalently λ.
Encryption, ?(m): To encrypt a message <m n, choose at ran-
dom <w n, and determine the encrypted message c as follows:
?( ) =m c = g ·m nw (mod 2n .) Decryption, ( )? c : To decrypt c, verifying that <c n2, the plain
text message is computed as follows:
( ) = ( ( ))
( ( ))
( ) =
λ
λ? c
L c n
L g n
n m
mod
mod
mod .
2
2
2.2. Digital signature scheme
The digital signature scheme deﬁned by Paillier system has two
steps: generation of the signature and its corresponding veriﬁca-
tion. Note that key generation is done as described for encryption/
decryption.
 Signature generation, ( )? m : Let → { }* ⊂ * h: 0, 1
n2
be a hash
function seen as a random oracle. The signature of the message
<m n is composed of two parts, ( ) = { }? m s s,1 2 , where
( )
( )
( )
=
( ) ( )
( )
( )
= ( ) ( )
λ
λ
λ− ( )
s
L h m n
L g n
n
s h m g n
mod
mod
mod ,
mod .s n
1
2
2
2
1 mod1
 Signature veriﬁcation, ( )? m : To verify the signature, ( )s s,1 2 , of
the message m, the following formula has to be checked:
( ) = · ( )h m g s nmod .s n? 2 213. Model
This section introduces the underlying model of the proposed 
protocol. Particularly, Section 3.1 describes the participant entities, 
whereas Sections 3.2 and 3.3 introduce the trust and adversarial 
models, respectively. Section 3.4 introduces the working assump-
tions and Section 3.5 presents the goals of PAgIoT.
3.1. Entities
PAgIoT is an aggregation protocol that preserves authenticity of 
the data at stake, as well as the privacy of the participants. A 
central node S, referred to as sink, is responsible for gathering and 
analyzing all the aggregated data. PAgIoT is performed on the2
assumption that nodes are grouped into clusters. In each cluster,
we identify two type of nodes: Master nodes, denoted asMj, which
act as cluster heads and aggregate data from General nodes,
∈G Mi
j j, for each j, which are the actual data sources. The in-
formation managed in PAgIoT is related to one or more of Gij at-
tributes (e.g. height, heart rate). Next, we explain these types of
entities and give a high-level overview of their functions within
the protocol:
 Sink node, S: It gathers all data in order to perform a posterior 
analysis. Thus, S broadcasts queries and receives responses from 
the Gij nodes in the network. As a result, S gets an aggregated
vision of the values of Gij attributes. Furthermore, S is able to
correlate aggregated values. As an example, consider attributes 
height and heart rate. By querying on these attributes (we detail 
the querying process in Section 4.3) S may know that there are 
47 people being [150,160] cm tall (aggregation), and also that 23 
of them have a heart rate among [51,90] beats per minute 
(correlation). S has one public/private key pair, { ,K kS S}, for both 
encryption and signature purposes.
 Master nodes, Mj: We assume that the network where PAgIoT
operates is divided into several clusters. In each cluster j, there
is one master node Mj that receives queries Q and forwards
them to the remainder nodes of the cluster Gij. Then, it receives
responses from these nodes, aggregates them and sends the
result to S.
 General nodes, Gij: These are the actual sources of information.
They receive the queries from their cluster head, Mj. After pro-
cessing the query, they generate the corresponding response
and send it to their master nodeMj. They are assumed to know S
public key KS.
3.2. Trust model
We consider that S is a trusted party, whereas both Gij and Mj
are partially trusted. Particularly Gij are honest-but-curious, which
means that they can eavesdrop others data, but they cannot lie nor
refuse to give information to S when asked. Regarding Mj, besides
eavesdropping, we assume that they may pollute the results by
omitting responses, creating new ones or modifying their content.
3.3. Adversarial model
The proposed adversarial model considers the following
attacks:
 Eavesdropping: Any node may intercept communications trying
to know attributes of another.
 Collusion attack: Mj nodes may collude to discover attributes of
Gi
j nodes.
It must be noted that the collusion of S and Mj is out of scope
since it would unavoidably lead to a privacy violation – it could
be possible for S to get each response of every node Gij.
 Pollution attack: Mj may create artiﬁcial responses to deceive S.
Likewise, Mj may alter queries to request Gij chosen attributes
and may alter the amount of received responses, deleting some
of them.
3.4. Working assumptions
Following we enumerate the assumptions of the working sce-
nario of PAgIoT:
1. Resilient communications: We assume that transmission control 
mechanisms (such as Chouikhi et al., 2015; Kusy et al., 2014) areimplemented by all participants. Thanks to these techniques,
the communication channel becomes resilient, meaning that
data between nodes (i.e. between Gij and Mj or between Mj and
S) is never lost. In practical terms, it means that the channel is
available and that transmission control mechanisms are imple-
mented by all participants.
2. Node resources: We assume that S has enough computational
resources to decrypt and process the received responses. Re-
garding Mj and Gij, we consider that they can be resource-con-
strained – they can be implemented in modern smart devices
(such as smartwatches or smartphones). This way, it allows the
protocol to be run in open and wireless scenarios. Moreover, Gij
nodes are assumed to have a pseudo-random number
generator.
3. Clustered network: We assume that nodes are divided into
clusters before the execution of PAgIoT. This could be the case of
static scenarios or dynamic scenarios where a clustering algo-
rithm is previously run. While research on clustering algorithms
for dynamic and mobile scenarios is large, the insights of such a
clustering process are out of scope of this paper.
3.5. Goals
The main goal of PAgIoT is to provide a secure aggregation
protocol for IoT scenarios, where a large amount of nodes want to
share information with a central sink. Speciﬁcally, the goals of the
protocol PAgIoT are:
 Privacy preservation: Gij nodes deliver requested data preserving
their anonymity. Conﬁdentiality has to be guaranteed as well,
such that S is the only node which accesses to all delivered data
after being aggregated.
 Collusion resistance: Nodes Mj and Gij may collude but data from
other nodes must remain inaccessible.
 Veriﬁable aggregation: EachMj aggregates data and S veriﬁes the
proper aggregation. S checks that aggregated data belongs to
nodes Gij involved in the protocol, thus it simultaneously tests
the existence of malicious Mj which corrupt aggregated data.
 Correlatable aggregation: S must be able to get not only the
aggregated results for several attributes, but also to know how
attribute values correlate each other.4. Protocol description
The main idea of PAgIoT is that it allows for aggregation of 
pieces of information (attributes of a set of entities), enabling the 
correlation between attribute values. A key feature is that no node 
is able to reveal information of the aggregated data from any other 
node. Indeed, even the sink S, which recovers aggregated data and 
may correlate the attribute values, cannot link this information to 
particular nodes, thus preserving their privacy. The notation in use 
throughout the paper is shown in Table 1.
The protocol overview is presented in Section 4.1. Afterwards, 
all protocol phases are described. PAgIoT consists of ﬁve phases 
depicted in Fig. 1: the system setup (Section 4.2), query broad-
casting (Section 4.3), response creation (Section 4.4), response 
processing and ﬁnal computation (Section 4.5). Moreover, the al-
gorithm to detect malicious alterations of responses by Mj is pre-
sented in Section 4.6.
4.1. Protocol overview
PAgIoT works in a query-response way (Fig. 1). When the sink 
node S wants to get information from nodes Gij, it sends them a
signed query ?kS (Q ). As nodes are organized in clusters, this3
Table 1
Notation.
Element Meaning
S Sink node
Mj Head of cluster j
Gi
j Node i belonging to cluster j
KS / kS Paillier public/private key of S
(·)?K / (·)?K Encryption/decryption procedures using key K
(·)?K / (·)?K Generation/veriﬁcation procedures of a signature using key K
Qi Query i broadcasted by S
ai Attribute i
Ii Interval of values for attribute ai
Ri
j Response of Gij node
( ) =? R RK i
j
i
j Encrypted response of Gij node using key K
l Bitlength required to express the possession of an attribute
| |x Bitlength of the value x
| |A Number of elements of set Acommunication is performed through cluster heads Mj which di-
rectly forwards the query to their cluster nodes. Each Gij constructs
its response Rij and encrypts it applying Paillier cryptosystem,
( )? RK ijS . This response is again sent through Mj, which performs
aggregation prior to forwarding back to S. Accordingly, once Mj has 
gathered all responses to the query from its cluster members, it 
aggregates all of them leveraging on the homomorphic feature of 
Paillier and generates the aggregated response Rj. The result is 
sent to S, which again aggregates all the responses from received 
from master nodes. Then, S can decrypt the overall response and 
get the aggregated vision of the required data.
One important aspect is that Mj could attempt to counterfeit 
the aggregation. For example, it could try to inject an artiﬁcial 
response to deceive S. To address this issue, each node Gij in-
troduces a unique, incremental random number into each re-
sponse. Based on this number, S can determine if any Mj has pol-
luted its results by applying a Misbehaving aggregator detection 
algorithm, which is further explained in Section 4.6.
4.1.1. Supporting example
Let us consider that S is the emergency manager of a football 
stadium, which is divided into zones or clusters as in Fig. 2 (without 
loss of generality, in the example we use 2 clusters for simplicity). S 
deﬁnes three heart rate intervals (e.g. [0,50], [51,90] and [91,200]) 
and two gender types (male, female) and launches the ﬁrst query 
(Q1) to discover the heart rate and gender of each person (each one 
carrying a node Gij).
Once the aggregated response has been retrieved, S launches a 
second query which is only devoted to females as the prevalence of 
heart disease is higher on them.1 Particularly, this second query 
(Q2) consists of discovering the age of women. Three intervals are 
deﬁned concerning age, namely, [0,30], [31,60] and [61,100].
Based on these settings, the following subsections will show 
how PAgIoT works to address this need.
4.2. Setup
At the beginning of the protocol, each node Gij that takes part in 
the protocol receives the public key from S, KS. Besides, each node 
Gi
j generates an unique random number rij. This number may be 
much bigger than the amount of Gij nodes to minimize collisions.1 https://www.heart.org/idc/groups/heart-public/@wcm/@sop/@smd/docu 
ments/downloadable/ucm_449846.pdf, last accessed in October, 20, 2015.The number is encrypted and sent to S through Mj. Thus, pre-
venting S from linking a given rij to any particular node.
4.3. Query broadcasting
Whenever S desires, it broadcasts queries Q to all cluster heads 
Mj. The query asks for a set of attribute values from the nodes Gij 
that S wants to know. A query Q is formally deﬁned as:
Q ?kS= ({A I, , l} ,)
where the set = {A a1 …, , na }  contains all attributes ai that are at 
stake in the current query, the set = {I I1 …, , nI }  contains the in-
tervals of values for each attribute, and l is the amount of bits 
required to express the possession of an attribute.
Recalling the supporting example (Section 4.1.1), the two 
queries Q1 and Q2 are formed as follows:
= ({{ } {{[ ] [ ] [ ]}
[ ]} })
= ({{ } {{[ ] [ ] [ ]}
[ ]} })
?
?
Q
Q
heart rate, gender , 0, 50 , 51, 90 , 91, 200 ,
male, female , 3 ,
age, gender , 0, 30 , 31, 60 , 61, 100 ,
female , 3 ,
k
k
1
2
S
S
One parameter that deserves attention is the value l¼3. The
rationale behind this is as follows. The aggregation process counts
how many nodes have an attribute value that matches each in-
terval. Accordingly, the maximum number of matches for a given
interval is the total number of nodes in the network, say | |G . Thus,
the number of required bits to express the possession can be
calculated as shown in the following equation:
= ⌈ (| |)⌉ ( )l Glog . 12
In the example (recall Fig. 2), l = ⌈ log2(6)⌉ =  3.
Last but not least, queries are signed by S to prevent them from
malicious manipulations. Particularly, as they are sent through Mj,
the signature guarantees that queries are not altered by any Mj.
4.4. Response creation
Each node Gij veriﬁes the signature of the received query, and
constructs the response, Rij, based on the query. In a nutshell, Rij
contains a set of bits for each combination of values of the queried
attributes. For the sake of brevity, each one of these sets is referred
to as a property Pi. Each node Gij puts Pi¼1 if it meets the property,
and Pi¼0 otherwise.
The total amount of properties, Np, is calculated as the amount
of possible combinations of intervals Ii of the requested attributes
ai, i.e.:
∏= | |N Ip
i
i
The node Gij inserts into Rij its random number, rij, to be used in 
the misbehaving-aggregator-detection algorithm (Section 4.6). 
Thus, the ﬁnal structure of responses Rij is as follows, ∥being the 
concatenation operator:
= { ∥⋯∥ ∥ }R P P r .i
j
N i
j
1 p
The order of the properties within the response is assumed to
be agreed among all nodes in a given execution. For the sake
of simplicity, a pre-order combination of attributes is assumed in
this paper. Thus, if attribute a1 has three values and a2 has two,
property P1 is formed by the ﬁrst values of a1 and a2, P2 is
composed of the ﬁrst value of a1 and the second one of a2, P3
comes from the second value of a1 and the ﬁrst one of a2, and
so on.
Responses Rij are encrypted for S by Gij using the Paillier4
Fig. 1. Protocol phases.
Fig. 2. Execution of PAgIoT in the football stadium example: S receives the heart rate and gender of each node.cryptosystem and the encryption public key of S, ( ) =? R RK ij ijS .
Afterwards, Ri
j is sent to Mj.
One critical aspect for performance is the length of Rij. This 
length, lR, depends on the length of each property Pi and the 
number of bits of the maximum rij, lr. The length of this last 
parameter has to prevent collusion among nodes (studied in Sec-
tion 4.6). In order to allow aggregation, each property must be 
long enough to allow all nodes having that property. For this 
reason, each property must be l bits long (recall Section 4.3). Eq.
(2) shows the formal expression for lR:
= · + ( )l N l l . 2R p r
4.4.1. Response creation example
Following the supporting example (recall Section 4.1.1) 
and regarding Q1, six different properties (i.e. combinations of 
attri-butes) are noticed: to be female with [0,50], [51,90] or 
[91,200] beats per minute of heart rate or to be male with [0,50], 
[51,90] or [91,200] beats per minutes of heart rate. Accordingly:= {[ ] }
= {[ ] }
= {[ ] }
= {[ ] }
= {[ ] }
= {[ ] }
P
P
P
P
P
P
1 if 0, 50 , female ,
1 if 51, 90 , female ,
1 if 91, 200 , female ,
1 if 0, 50 , male ,
1 if 51, 90 , male ,
1 if 91, 200 , male .
1
2
3
4
5
6
Assuming a node G11 whose owner is female and whose heart
rate is 85, it would belong to P2 from the above. Considering =l 7r ,
the generated random number is represented as =r 2311 10¼
00101112. Last but not least, recall that l¼3. With all these ele-
ments, the response remains as follows:
= { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 001 000 000 000 000 0010111 .11
4.4.2. Preventing eavesdroppers
Depending on the queried values, a given node Gij may or may
not reply to them. Again applying the supporting example but5
R r i
i
concerning Q2, node G22 could be male and then, it is not forced to 
send an answer. However, in such a case the remaining cluster 
nodes (G21, G23 and M2, see Fig. 2) would learn its gender. Thus, 
defending against eavesdroppers is critical.
To address this issue, it is important to note that Gij nodes are 
honest (recall Section 3). Thus, they cannot send false responses. 
However, Gij nodes can build an empty response (i.e. all properties 
Pi set to zero, using the right value of rij) to defeat eavesdroppers. 
This decision (i.e. giving an empty response or avoiding to reply) 
may be based on internal Gij parameters, such as reducing battery 
consumption.
4.5. Response processing
Intermediate nodes Mj receive Ri
j from their cluster members, 
Gi
j. These intermediate nodes aggregate the information by com-
puting the multiplication of all encrypted responses, thus building 
their response Rj, that is,
j = ∏ R j .Fig. 3. Misbehaving-aggregator-detection algorithmThis is the main advantage of using the homomorphic features 
of Paillier cryptosystem – the multiplication of Ri
j leads to the 
addition of Rij (after decryption). Given the encoding proposed in 
the responses, each different property, Pi, will be added (i.e. ag-
gregated) with others, but the node Mj cannot reveal information 
as data is encrypted.
Afterwards each Mj concatenates Rj with a number Nr, that 
expresses the amount of multiplied Ri
j . The use of Nr is associated 
with the misbehaving-aggregator-detection algorithm described 
in Section 4.6. Once Rj is created, it is sent to S. Later, S multiplies 
all received Rj to have all data aggregated, and then decrypts it 
using kS.4.5.1. Response processing example
Regarding Q1 of the supporting example and detailed in the 
upper part of Fig. 3, it is supposed that M1 and M2 have received 
information from all Gij nodes, j1 2≤ ≤  and i1 3≤ ≤ , in thei
respective clusters each of one having the following properties:applied over the football stadium example.
6
Table 2
Sample aggregation of decrypted responses R1 and R2 by S.
M1 = { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 001 000 000 000 000 001011111
= { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 000 000 000 000 001 000100121
= { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 000 000 000 001 000 000011031
M2 = { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 001 000 000 000 000 001000112
= { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 000 000 000 000 001 000101122
= { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 001 000 000 000 000 000001132
S = { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 001 000 000 001 001 01001101
= { ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ }R 000 010 000 000 000 001 00111112∼ {[ ] } ≈ =
∼ {[ ] } ≈ =
∼ {[ ] } ≈ =
∼ {[ ] } ≈ =
∼ {[ ] } ≈ =
∼ {[ ] } ≈ =
G P r
G P r
G P r
G P r
G P r
G P r
51, 90 , female , with 23 ,
91, 200 , male , with 9 ,
51, 90 , male , with 6 ,
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When S decrypts R1 and R2, the aggregation of all responses of 
each cluster would be as shown in Table 2. It can be concluded that 
there are three nodes female with heart rate between [51,90] (one 
of them belonging to the cluster 1 and the other two to the cluster 
2), two nodes male with a heart rate between [91,200] (one of 
each node) and a node male with a heart rate between [51,90]
(from the cluster 1).
Finally, S has to verify if any Mj has altered or dropped re-
sponses. To do so, the algorithm presented in the following section 
is developed.4.6. Misbehaving aggregator detection algorithm
This algorithm helps to detect malicious Mj which lie about the 
amount of received responses. It leverages on the random number 
ri
j introduced in each response. The algorithm works as follows:
1. Each Gij creates a random number rij and sends it, encrypted, to
Mj, thus avoiding S linking rij with Gij. Each of such values should
be < +r L Ni
j
r Q , where Lr is an upper limit of ri
j and NQ an upper
limit of the expected number of queries. Accordingly, the
number of bits to deﬁne rij, denoted as lr, is calculated from the
number of nodes Gij involved in the protocol, | |G , and ( + )L Nr Q ,
see the following equation:
= ⌈ ( + )⌉·⌈ (| |)⌉ ( )l L N Glog log . 3r r Q2 2
2.
3.
Response creation and Response processing (recall Sections 
4.4 and 4.5) are executed.
Once S decrypts multiplied responses, it veriﬁes that the last 
concatenated value, Nr, is the sum of received r j + 1 in the setup
i
phase of all received responses. The amount of operations to 
perform is equivalent to the calculus of combinations of Gij
nodes involved in the protocol, | |G , choosing Nr of them, see the 
following equation:
| | = | |!
! (| | − )! ( )
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟
G
N
G
N G N 4r r r
Then, S just has to calculate the sum of all +r 1i
j because all
nodes have answered. Thus, S checks if∑ +
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟r 1
i j
i
j
,
is equivalent to the last part of the concatenated values of
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When this process ﬁnishes, S updates values of all rij to be ready 
for the following query.
According to Q1 of the supporting example (upper part of Fig. 3),
S stores the values of all rij: =r 2211 , =r 821 , =r 531 , =r 1612 , =r 1022 ,
and =r 232 . Later, S computes the sum of all such values,
obtaining
∑ + = + + + + + =
≤ ≤ ≤ ≤
⎛
⎝
⎜⎜
⎞
⎠
⎟⎟r 1 23 9 6 17 11 3 69,
i j
i
j
1 3,1 2
which coincides with the last part of the decrypted value 
obtained by S (see Eq. (5)). Finally, S updates the values of rij,
increasing each of them in 1: =r 2311 , =r 921 , =r 631 , =r 1712 ,
=r 1122 , and =r 332 .
4. Assuming that S sends a second query, the process is repeated
=
!( − )!
=⎝⎜ ⎠⎟5
with the exception that each Gij increments rij by one. It must be
noted that all nodes update their value of rij, no matter if they
answer to a query or not.
Again on the bases of the supporting example (lower part of
Fig. 3), assuming that G11, G21 and G23 are women and G31 and G22
answer to preserve their anonymity, S performs
⎛ 6 ⎞ 6!
5 6 5
6
operations to verify the correct reception of responses. In
particular, it calculates all possible combinations and if
+ + + + + + + + + = + + + +
=
r r r r r1 1 1 1 1 24 7 18 12 4
65
1
1
3
1
1
2
2
2
3
2
is reached, it means that all Mj have behaved properly. Finally, S
updates rij.
It is noteworthy that if a set of x additions get the same value,
the veriﬁcation of the next query would multiply by a factor of x
the amount of operations. However, operations do not ex-
ponentially increase with the number of queries because after
each query, S knows values of rij applied for the following ver-
iﬁcation. Moreover, note that rij are random and kept secret
(through the use of encryption), to avoid malicious nodes from the
inference or injection of well-formed responses.5. Evaluation
This section presents a theoretical and an empirical evaluation.
Firstly, the assessment of established goals is studied (Section 5.1). 
Secondly, privacy preservation and, particularly, the data that may 
be inadvertently guessed by Mj is analyzed (Section 5.2). Thirdly, a 
performance analysis is presented (Section 5.3). Lastly, PAgIoT is 
compared against the two works that provide with the same set of 
security properties, as it is discussed in Section 6. This analytical 
comparison is shown (Section 5.4).
5.1. Goals assessment Privacy preservation: Data sent from every Gij is encrypted with
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Fig. 4. Prevented attacks.
Fig. 5. Response encryption time measured in a smartphone.the public key KS, which belongs to S. It ensures conﬁdentiality 
and avoids malicious eavesdroppers to access the private data. 
Besides, since S only receives aggregated data, individual 
anonymity of nodes Gij is preserved. In particular, S is unable to 
explicitly identify Gij by analyzing received attributes. In Section 
5.2 we conduct a further analysis of the capabilities of Mj nodes 
to infer data from the received responses within their clusters.
 Collusion resistance: Each node Gij encrypts data and sends it to
Mj. Neither Mj nor Gij know the decryption key and then even
colluding, no data of other nodes is accessible. A force brute
attack can be also considered. However, as Paillier cryptosystem
produces different cyphertext from the same clear text, the at-
tack would be impractical. Due to these considerations the
collusion among multiple Mj or an Mj and several Gij do not
compromise the system.
 Veriﬁable aggregation: The inclusion of incremental random
numbers rij in each response (applied in the misbehaving-ag-
gregator-detection algorithm) helps to verify the correctness of
the aggregation guaranteeing that Mj properly aggregate all
received responses.
 Correlatable aggregation: The design of responses, based on
combining attribute values, allows S to correlate such values 
without additional computation.
Summarized in Fig. 4, encryption prevents from eavesdropping
as data is inaccessible. Likewise, encryption together with the fact 
that S is the only one which owns the decryption key, avoids 
collusion attacks (recall that or proposal is based on asymmetric 
cryptography). Conversely, the introduction of random numbers 
within responses allows the identiﬁcation of malicious behaviors. 
S can detect, based on the received sum of random numbers, if the 
aggregation is or not polluted.
5.2. Characterizing the privacy preservation
One of the key aspects of PAgIoT is that it prevents S from 
linking the answers to particular Gij. This statement is also true for 
Mj, since answers are encrypted for S. There is, however, a room for 
Mj to gain information about a given Gij. This section focuses on 
how this undesired result may happen.
In a nutshell, information gain by Mj depends on two main 
factors: the set of queries and the context knowledge of Mj. To
illustrate this issue, the supporting example is considered (recall
Section 4.1). As the ﬁrst query Q1 is general, all nodes will give an
answer. However, query Q2 is only focused on women. As a result, 
a given male node (say G12) is not forced to give an answer.
Considering this issue, the information gain that M1 achieves 
from G12 is clear: his gender. The capacity of giving a void response 
for these cases is critical for privacy preservation. In such a case, 
thanks to the use of encryption, M1 cannot discover that G12 is 
giving a void response and thus, gender leakage is prevented.One obvious consequence of this is that G12 must keep a co-
herent participation pattern. Let us consider that S sends a third
query, Q3 that asks all women for their heart rate, using all pos-
sible intervals. G12 must also give a void answer because otherwise
M1 would discover that the answer to Q2 was useless and that, in
the end, G12 is a male.
Apart from this issue, context knowledge of Mj also plays an
important role. If the example was done in a football-related su-
permarket (say an ofﬁcial store for a given football club), Mj could
predict in advance the most probable proﬁle of any Gij. Particularly,
the expected gender of Gij would be male (say 75% of them).
Therefore, if Q2 is answered by 40%, a given Mj would know that a
portion of answers (an estimated amount of 15% of them) are void.
Although it could not lead to a precise identiﬁcation, this could be
combined with the remaining queries.
Considering the previous facts, privacy preservation in PAgIoT
is achieved as long as S carefully designs its queries in such a way
that they do not lead to a data leakage, either individually or by
combination. Furthermore, how Gij determines when to partici-
pate in unforced queries may also contribute to this issue.
5.3. Performance analysis
The performance analysis focuses on the study of the compu-
tation cost to test the feasibility of developing PAgIoT, as well as
the size of responses to analyze channel bandwidth.
5.3.1. Computation time
In order to measure consumed resources by the protocol in a
real setting, the functionality of both Gij nodes and S has been
implemented. Mj nodes are less challenging, since they only for-
ward queries and responses, and perform linear additions of the
received encrypted responses. Thus, they are assumed to have
enough resources to cope with the amount of nodes in their
cluster.
Gi
j is emulated by an Android application running in smart-
phones with constrained resources (i.e., battery and power). Re-
garding S, it is implemented as an Ubuntu server. We conduct the
experiments using a Samsung Galaxy S3 (processor ARMv7 and
832 MB of RAM) and an Intel Core 2 Processor (3.00 GHz) with
4 GB of RAM.
In the experiments the size of the Paillier security parameter k
is 256 (i.e., | | =n 512). We have experimented with constant values8
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 for requested attributes (note that in a real scenario, these values 
will be either stored in the node or requested to wearable or other 
devices from the user). Moreover, different network sizes are 
tested, namely |G| ∈ {28, 216, 232, 264}, as well as A| |  from 2 to 
and |Ii | = 3 for all attributes. Under these assumptions the com-
putation time of each protocol phase and operation have been 
measured. Nonetheless, ﬁndings show that the encryption of re-
sponses is by far the most costly operation and it is the only one 
which is worth studying. The computation cost of remaining op-
erations can be considered negligible in the proposed scenario.
Under the previous setting, Fig. 5 shows encryption time. It is
noticed that requesting up to 6 attributes can be performed in less 
than half of a second with any size of the network. Indeed, in a 
network with, e.g., 216 nodes which can be considered a large scale 
network, encrypting a response when 7 attributes are requested 
still requires less than a second of computation. Indeed, in a worst 
case scenario when 9 attributes are requested, for 
|G| ∈ {2 ,8 12 6, 232, 264}, the encryption time is 1.6; 2.6; 5.2 and 
10.3 s., respectively. These results show that, even with such 
amount of requested attributes, the protocol is particularly feasible 
for networks with 28 and 216 nodes.
The experimental results show that the protocol PAgIoT is 
suitable to be implemented in a large scale network composed by 
one central server, running in a non-constrained system (like a 
high performance computing server) and a large number of nodes 
running an application which consumes few resources.
5.3.2. Responses size analysis
This analysis focuses on studying the size of the responses, lR, 
which is a critical parameter for the overall performance of the 
network and particularly related to the channel bandwidth. The 
aim of this analysis is to determine the most appropriate values for 
the size of the network, | |G , the size of intervals of each attribute, 
|Ii |, and the amount of requested attributes, A| |  , in a query. Beside
three thresholds are considered, namely, the maximum amount of
bytes that can be sent in a long text message, TH1, that is 480 bytes
(Sheets et al., 2012); the maximum size of a TCP packet, TH2, that
is 64 kbytes; and the average size of a WhatsApp message, TH3,
that is 225 kbytes (Fiadino et al., 2015). Note that TH1 and TH2 are
chosen for being units of information transmission in networks 
and TH3 for illustrative purposes as WhatsApp is a widespread 
application.
In the proposed experiment different values of network sizes 
and attributes are applied, namely |G| ∈ {2 ,8 12 6, 232, 264}  and
|Ai | ∈ {2, 6, 10}. For simplicity, it is assumed that all requestedTable 3
lR for different values of | |G , |Ii |, and | |A .
|Ai| | | =G 28 | | =G 216
| | =I 3i
| | =A 2i 223.5 447.0
| | =A 6i 1887.5 3775.0
| | =A 10i 8159.5 16,000.0
| | =I 5i
| | =A 2i 415.51 831.02
| | =A 6i 62,367.51 124,735.02
| | =A 10i 800,159.51 1,600,000.00
| | =I 10i
| | =A 2i 8351.51 16,703.02
| | =A 6i 483,729,567.51 967,459,135.02
| | =A 10i 80,000,000,159.51 160,000,000,00
TH1: 3840
TH2: 524,280
TH3: 1,800,000attributes have the same interval size, that is, |Ii | ∈ {3, 5, 10}. The 
size of the random number lr is established in regard to Lr = 106
and the number of expected queries NQ is set to 5000. Note that lr,
identiﬁed from Eq. (3), does not signiﬁcantly affect lR and then, a
high value for lr is chosen as a representative example. Results are
depicted in Table 3 where values under TH1, TH2 and TH3 are bold,
italic and underline style, respectively.
The worst results (and unacceptable under the established 
thresholds) occur when |Ii | = 10 and |A| > 2. However, challenging 
results are achieved in the remaining cases. Under TH1 for |A| = 2 
and |Ii | = {3, 5}, all lR are accepted except for |G| = {  322 , 264} when
|A| = 6. In the case of TH2, the only rejected results are those in 
which |A| = 10 and |Ii | = {5, 10}. Similarly, for TH3 all values are 
accepted except for those in which |A| = 10, |Ii | = 5 and
|G| = {  322 , 264} and in which |A| = 10 and |Ii | = 10. Moreover, | |G also
affects lR but not as much as the remaining elements. Indeed, 
|G| = {  322 , 264}  are the only values which affect lR negatively. For
instance, for |Ii | = 5 and |A| = 6, lR¼124,735 when |G| = 216 and 
lR¼249,470 when |G| = 232. It means that lR increments 50% when 
| |G increases 216%.
In sum, lR remains between established thresholds once 
choosing many A| |  (about 10) with small amount of |Ii | (about 5) 
few A| |  (about 2) with high amount of |Ii | (about 10). On the con
trary, the total number of nodes in the network, | |G , is not a dis-
tinguishing factor because lR is much lesser affected by this ele-
ment than by the number of requested attributes, A| |  , or the r
quested intervals for each attribute, |Ii |.
The above results show that PAgIoT is suitable for large scale 
networks, composed by a great number of nodes. However, a pair 
of issues should be considered concerning attributes and intervals. 
On the one hand, these elements have to be chosen in regard to 
each particular scenario to prevent from performance problems. 
On the other hand, attributes and intervals particularly affect the 
channel bandwidth. It is worth recalling that due to the query/
response approach used in PAgIoT, as well as the use of clustering, 
the amount of trafﬁc is limited and distributed. Each query must 
arrive to every Gij node through Mj nodes, and at least | |G packets 
are transmitted. However, nodes can decide to respond to a query, 
and thus the response process generate less than | |G packets or | |G 
packets at most. While this may be object of further research 
when implementing PAgIoT in a real scenario, current mobile 
technologies such as 802.11 or 3G, can deal with such large scale 
settings provided that enough access points are placed within the
scenario (Riiser et al., 2013; Chen et al., 2012).| | =G 232 | | =G 264
894.0 1788.1
7550.0 15,100.1
32,000.0 65,276.1
1662.04 3324.08
249,470.04 498,940.08
3,200,000.00 6,401,276.08
33,406.04 66,812.08
1,934,918,270.04 3869,836,540.08
0.00 320,000,000,000.00 640,000,001,276.08
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Table 4
Comparison HDA (Kim et al., 2013), iCPDA (He et al., 2009) and PAgIoT , where n is 
the amount of nodes.
Proposals Number of keys Number of interchanged messages
Setup Aggregation Aggregation veriﬁcation
HDA +n 1 +n2 2 +n 1 +n2 2
iCPDA ( + )n n 1
2
+n 22 +n5 5 1
PagIoT pair1 +n2 1 +n2 2 05.4. Analytical comparison
An analytical comparison between PAgIoT, HDA (Kim et al., 
2013) and iCPDA (He et al., 2009) is performed herein. The last two 
proposals have been chosen for being the ones whose security 
requirements are similar to those set for PAgIoT (see Section 6). For 
the sake of clarity, we refer the reader to Section 6 to get a brief 
description of these works.
The comparison is performed based on two aspects that are 
relevant for measuring the performance of the proposal, namely 
the amount of keys at stake and the amount of transmitted mes-
sages in the setup, aggregation and aggregation veriﬁcation phases 
within a single cluster. Thus, it can be easily extrapolated to any 
number of clusters. To perform a fair comparison it is assumed that 
clusters are already created, that each cluster is composed of n 
nodes Gij and that aggregated data is sent from the head of the 
cluster Mj to the sink S.
Table 4 presents results of the comparison. The number of keys 
is particularly noticeable in HDA and iCPDA. In the former proposal 
each Gij shares a key with Mj and this latter with S. In iCPDA a 
protocol is enforced in which each Gij shares a key with all other 
nodes in the cluster as well as with Mj. Conversely, in PAgIoT a 
public key cryptosystem is applied in which just a keypair (public/
private) is used for encryption and aggregation purposes.
Concerning sent messages, we analyze each phase separately. 
In the Setup phase results are quite similar in PAgIoT and HDA. In 
HDA, nodes, including Mj with S, create the key to apply in the 
remaining parts of the protocol. The process is compared to a 
Difﬁe–Hellman protocol but in the context of elliptic curves. In 
PAgIoT a message composed of the sink public key KS is sent to 
each Gij. Subsequently, each Gij creates a random number and 
sends it encrypted to Mj which redirects them to S. A more costly 
process is performed in iCPDA. A key establishment protocol is 
executed such that each Gij performs a broadcast communication 
with all the remaining G and lastly Mj shares keys with S.
Signiﬁcant differences are identiﬁed comparing the Aggrega-
tion phase. HDA requires computing Hilbert curve points and a 
sum of them to be sent the result to Mj and redirected to S sub-
sequently. In iCPDA the aggregation can be divided in three parts: 
ﬁrstly each Gij broadcasts a random number to all G in the cluster 
(2 n( + 1) messages); secondly each Gij computes a polynomial per 
other G and sends results to each of them (2 n( + 1) messages); and 
ﬁnally, each Gij performs a ﬁnal addition of polynomials and sends 
the result to Mj which redirects it to S ( n + 1 messages). By con-
trast, in PAgIoT S sends a query and each Gij responses accordingly 
to Mj and ﬁnally the result is received by S.
The amount of messages interchanged for aggregation ver-
iﬁcation is specially signiﬁcant in HDA. A Privacy Information Re-
trieval (PIR) technique is applied. Each Gij, also Mj from S, receives 
an integrity request message and G response accordingly. The 
protocol proposed in iCPDA consists of sending a message from Mj
to other M disclosing received information to detect malicious 
behaviors. A different approach proposes PAgIoT, the veriﬁcation isperformed using data within the received aggregated message and
thus, no extra messages are needed.
Results drawn from this comparison show that PAgIoT is spe-
cially appropriate in terms of key management and aggregation
veriﬁcation. Moreover, the amount of messages in the setup phase
is analogous to HDA and outperforms iCPDA. Concerning ag-
gregation, HDA involves less amount of messages than PAgIoT
because an initial request query is not required. However, iCPDA is
by far the proposal with worse results producing a signiﬁcant
workload in the network. In sum, considering that PAIoT outper-
forms iCPDA in all cases, it can also be considered a better alter-
native than HDA because no messages are required for aggregation
veriﬁcation and just one key is managed.6. Related work
Aggregation has been a challenging topic so far (Rajagopalan
and Varshney, 2006; Heidemann et al., 2001). Multiple proposals
have been developed, from the aggregation of values (Applebaum
et al., 2010; Xiaoying et al., 2014; Buttyán and Holczer, 2010; Li
et al., 2014; Horey et al., 2007; Chan et al., 2007; Othman et al.
2015; Ma et al., 2015; Manni et al., 2015; Villas et al., 2013; Conti
et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2015), to additions (He et al., 2007; Wenbo
et al., 2008; He et al., 2009; Bae et al., 2016; Rieffel et al., 2014;
Rastogi and Nath, 2010; Raj et al., 2016; He et al., 2016; Fan et al.
2014; Grining et al., 2016), calculus of minimums or maximums
(Madden et al., 2002; Groat et al., 2011; Rodero et al., 2010) or
even more complex tasks such as averages (Ren et al., 2013;
Madden et al., 2002; Chan et al., 2007; Castelluccia et al., 2005)
variances (Ren et al., 2013; Castelluccia et al., 2005), range queries
(Xiaoying et al., 2014) or logic operations (Kumar et al., 2015).
Over the years security requirements have been introduced in
this process (Cheikhrouhou, 2015). Anonymity is specially re-
markable because aggregators should not learn particular data
Some proposals focus on the anonymity of messages passed through
aggregator nodes (Xiaoying et al., 2014; Horey et al., 2007; Groat et
al., 2011) or on identity preservation of such nodes (Buttyán and
Holczer, 2010) or nodes providing information (He et al., 2007;
Wenbo et al., 2008; Applebaum et al., 2010; He et al., 2009; Rieffel et
al., 2014). Anonymity is generally achieved by the use of
cryptographic schemes, e.g. symmetric encryption (He et al., 2007;
Xiaoying et al., 2014; Buttyán and Holczer, 2010; Chan et al., 2007)
or more sophisticated schemes like homomorphic encryp-tion
(Kumar et al., 2015; Bae et al., 2016; Rieffel et al., 2014; Rastogi and
Nath, 2010; Othman et al., 2015; Raj et al., 2016; He et al., 2016; Fan
et al., 2014; Grining et al., 2016; Castelluccia et al., 2005)
homomorphic aggregation of signatures (Fu et al., 2015) and
homomorphic encryption with re-randomization applying a proxy
(Applebaum et al., 2010). By contrast, Groat et al. (2011) propose the
use of randomized arrays instead of a cryptographic system. Each
node sends an array of values to the root of a subtree until reaching
the root of the tree (i.e. the overall aggregator). Values are in plain
text but the position of the real values in the array is only known by
the node which is root of the tree. Likewise, Horey et al.(2007) do
not use cryptography but negative surveys. Negative values are
transmitted from nodes providing information to the overall
aggregator, which reconstructs the ﬁnal histogram of data. Much
simpler aggregation techniques are proposed by Ma et al.(2015)
Manni et al. (2015), and Villas et al. (2013).They just mention the
aggregation of plain text data by a central entity.
Privacy preservation against observers is considered in He et al
(2007), Wenbo et al. (2008), Applebaum et al. (2010), Buttyán and
Holczer (2010), Kumar et al. (2015), Horey et al. (2007), He et al
(2009), Groat et al. (2011), Othman et al. (2015), He et al. (2016)
Fan et al. (2014), Castelluccia et al. (2005), Fu et al. (2015), Kim10
Table 5
Related work analysis.
Proposals Security properties Correlatable
aggregation
Aggregation purpose Encryption scheme
Anonymity of
sending nodes
Privacy preservation
against observers
Collusion
resistance
Veriﬁable
aggregation
Groat et al. (2011) ✓ √ ✓ Min, max
He et al. (2007) √ √ √ Sum Symmetric
Bae et al. (2016) √ √ Sum Homomorphic
Li et al. (2014) √ Sum Asymmetric
Wenbo et al.
(2008)
√ √ Sum not deﬁned
Madden et al.
(2002)
Count, min, max, sum,
average
Rodero et al. (2010) Count, min, max, sum
Ren et al. (2013) Count, min, max, sum,
average, stdev, variance
Applebaum et al.
(2010)
√ √ √ Sum Asymmetric
Xiaoying et al.
(2014)
√ Count Symmetric
Buttyán and Holc- √ Generic aggregation Symmetric
√ Count
√ √ Sum Homomorphic
√ Count, min, max, aver-
age, median
Symmetric
zer (2010)
Horey et al. (2007)
Rieffel et al. (2014) √
Chan et al. (2007)
Kumar et al. (2015) √ Not deﬁned Homomorphic
Rastogi and Nath
(2010)
√ √ Sum Homomorphic
Ma et al. (2015) Not deﬁned
Othman et al.
(2015)
√ √ Not deﬁned Homomorphic
Raj et al. (2016) Sum Homomorphic
He et al. (2016) √ √ Sum Homomorphic
Manni et al. (2015) Not deﬁned
Fan et al. (2014) √ Sum Homomorphic
Grining et al.
(2016)
√ √ Sum Homomorphic
Castelluccia et al.
(2005)
√ √ Sum,average,variance Homomorphic
Conti et al. (2009) √ √ Not deﬁned Asymmetric
Villas et al. (2013) Not deﬁned
Fu et al. (2015) √ √ Not deﬁned Not deﬁned
Yoon et al. (2014) √ √ Sum Symmetric
Kim et al. (2013) √ √ √ √ Sum Symmetric
He et al. (2009) √ √ √ √ Sum Symmetric
PAgIoT √ √ √ √ √ Count Homomorphicet al. (2013), and Yoon et al. (2014). The use of cryptography 
is demanding to manage this issue (He et al., 2007; Wenbo et 
al., 2008; Applebaum et al., 2010; Buttyán and Holczer, 2010; 
Kumar et al., 2015; Li et al., 2014; Horey et al., 2007; He et al., 
2009; Rieffel et al., 2014; Castelluccia et al., 2005; Fu et al., 
2015; Kim et al., 2013; Yoon et al., 2014), as well as randomized 
arrays or negative surveys (Groat et al., 2011).
Collusion resistant is another security requirement (He et al., 
2007; Applebaum et al., 2010; He et al., 2009; Rieffel et al., 2014; 
Rastogi and Nath, 2010; Kim et al., 2013). Particularly, He et al.
(2007, 2009) present collusion resistant proposals as long as 
clusters are big enough. In Applebaum et al. (2010) an aggregation 
scheme is proposed in which nodes, a proxy and a data base (DB) 
are involved. Messages are sent through the proxy to ﬁnally reach 
the DB. Collusion resistant is guaranteed when the proxy and theDB do not collude. Rieffel et al. (2014) apply multiple keys for 
decrypting values such that colluding parties are not able to infer 
all required keys. A different approach is taken in Rastogi and Nath 
(2010), collusion is avoided by trusting users whose values are 
aggregated. Conversely, in Kim et al. (2013) authors mention the 
protection against collusion but it is not particularly described 
how it is managed.
Verifying that aggregation is correctly performed without pol-
luted results is also addressed by several proposals (Xiaoying et al., 
2014; Chan et al., 2007; He et al., 2016, 2009; Li et al., 2014; 
Othman et al., 2015; Conti et al., 2009; Fu et al., 2015; Grining et al., 
2016; Kim et al., 2013; Yoon et al., 2014). A monitoring neighbor 
scheme is proposed in He et al. (2009), where neighbors of 
intermediate aggregator nodes monitor their behavior. Paper 
(Xiaoying et al., 2014) presents an integrity-veriﬁcation algorithm11
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 based on identifying unauthentic, superﬂuous or incomplete data, as
well as empty results. In Wenbo et al. (2008) redundancy checks are
applied and in Chan et al. (2007) a proof of correctness based on
hash functions is presented. On the other hand, Li et al. (2014)
focuses on data pollution against malicious intermediate ag-
gregator nodes. Authors propose that each leaf node veriﬁes its
parent's aggregation, considering that nodes are organized as a tree
He et al. (2016) apply digital signatures to provide message integrity
apart from conﬁdentiality. With the same purpose (Fu et al., 2015;
Othman et al., 2015) apply elliptic curve digital sig-natures. Conti et
al. (2009) address this issue from the point of view of data lost, twin-
keys are applied to obfuscate real values sent to the sink. In Yoon et
al. (2014) the imaginary part of a complex number is used to verify
integrity by aggregators and the sink node. A query-response
technique called PIR proposes (Kim et al., 2013) to verify messages
integrity.
Table 5 presents a summary of related works identifying the
management of anonymity of nodes, privacy preservation against
observers, collusion resistant, veriﬁable aggregation, correlatable
aggregation, aggregation purpose and encryption scheme. Indeed
these features are the goals addressed by PAgIoT. Here, √ means
that the property is fulﬁlled, whereas represents that the
property is not satisﬁed. For the sake of comparison, PAgIoT is 
included as well.
HDA (Kim et al., 2013) and iCPDA (He et al., 2009) are the
proposals whose security requirements are analogous to the ones
proposed in PAgIoT and then, they are brieﬂy described.
In particular, iCPDA proposes a clustering algorithm to enforce
data integrity and privacy. It bases on PDA (He et al., 2007) to
perform the clustering and the aggregation. After clustering and 
the enforcement of a key establishment protocol the aggregation 
starts. Aggregation focuses on addictive properties of polynomials. 
Nodes within a cluster compute a value of a polynomial for the 
remaining nodes in the cluster and send values to each appro-
priate node. Once values from all nodes are received, each of them 
sums received values and the result is sent to the cluster leader. 
This latter node computes a ﬁnal polynomial addition to create an 
aggregated message. iCPDA proposes other phase in which each 
cluster leader when receiving messages (of aggregated data) from 
downstream leaders, makes results accessible to all of them. If 
some leader identiﬁes that the received result is incorrect, a mis-
behavior is detected.
HDA proposes an aggregation scheme to also enforce data 
privacy and integrity. Hilbert-curve algorithm is applied to trans-
form one-dimensional data into two-dimensional data. Once 
clusters are created and pairs of nodes have computed and shared 
keys based on an elliptic curve Difﬁe–Hellman algorithm (ECDH), 
the aggregation is performed. Data sent from one node to another 
is encrypted through a Hilbert-curve algorithm and sent to the 
aggregator which adds received values to create the aggregated 
result. Then, another phase starts to verify data integrity. Parent 
nodes send to all child nodes a PIR message, that is a message to 
request children the computation of a value of their Hilbert curve. 
Nodes response and parents verify if the computation is correct 
and thus integrity holds.
In the light of this study some weaknesses, addressed by PA-
gIoT, are not considered by current proposals. In particular, PAgIoT 
proposes the privacy-preserving aggregation of data enabling 
correlation of original values while also managing anonymity of 
sending nodes, collusion resistant and veriﬁable aggregation.7. Conclusions
The huge amount of data spread worldwide provides the needfor data analysis, being aggregation a challenging activity in this
regard. Security cannot be taken for granted, being data authen-
ticity and users privacy major issues. This paper presents PAgIoT, a
privacy-preserving aggregation protocol for Internet of Things
(IoT) scenarios. It contributes to the aggregation of data based on
attribute-based queries and the homomorphic Paillier cryptosys-
tem. In fact, PAgIoT achieves correlatable aggregation, enabling the
sink to get not only the overall aggregated value, but also the
correlation between attribute values. A misbehaving aggregator
detection algorithm is also introduced to avoid malicious ag-
gregators. Results of the evaluation show that PAgIoT is feasible for
resource-constrained environments (such as IoT). Furthermore, it
is resistant to eavesdropping, collusion and pollution attacks, and
it is practical using a wide set of attributes and in relative large
networks (e.g. using queries composed of 10 attributes in net-
works of 216 nodes). Moreover, PAgIoT has been compared against
two previous works (referred to as HDA and iCPDA) that provide
with the same security properties. Results show that PAgIoT out-
performs both proposals considering the amount of keys at stake
and the number of messages sent.
Future work will be focused on the use of the proposed pro-
tocol in the cybersecurity context which involves, among other
issues, risks, threats and vulnerabilities management. The use of
other cryptographic schemes (particularly lightweight ones) will
be assessed as well.Acknowledgments
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